Lavori
I fatti della vita
Ronald LaingRonald Laing frasi celebri
da La politica dell'esperienza; citato in Gilles Deleuze e Félix Guattari, L'Anti-Edipo, traduzione di Alessandro Fontana, Einaudi, 2002, p. 147
p. 58
p. 1 dell'Introduzione
“La famiglia si può immaginare come una ragnatela, un fiore, una tomba, una prigione, un castello.”
citato in Focus n. 74, p. 194
Frasi sul viaggio di Ronald Laing
We do not need theories so much as the experience that is the source of the theory. We are not satisfied with faith, in the sense of an implausible hypothesis irrationally held: we demand to experience the "evidence".
We can see other people"s behaviour, but not their experience. This has led some people to insist that psychology has nothing to do with the other person"s experience, but only with his behaviour.
The other person"s behaviour is an experience of mine. My behaviour is an experience of the other. The task of social phenomenology is to relate my experience of the other"s behaviour to the other"s experience of my behaviour. Its study is the relation between experience and experience: its true field is inter-experience.
Origine: Da The Politics of Experience, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967, capitolo 1, Persons and Experience.
p. 104
Cap. 1 : Fondamenti esistenziali-fenomenologici per la scienza delle persone
Cap. 1 : Esperienza come evidenza
Frasi sulla vita di Ronald Laing
p. 1 dell'Introduzione
Origine: Mi ami?, p. 45
Ronald Laing Frasi e Citazioni
Cap.1 : Esperienza come evidenza
p. 28
pag. 58
Origine: I fatti della vita, p. 7
di casi che avvengono in uno spazio e in un tempo interiori, di esperienze chiamate pensieri, immagini, fantasticherie, sogni, visioni, allucinazioni, sogni di memorie, memorie di sogni, memorie di visioni, sogni di allucinazioni, rifrazioni di rifrazioni di rifrazioni di quelle originarie Alfa e Omega di esperienza e realtà, quella stessa Realtà su cui repressione, diniego, separazione, proiezione, falsificazione e generale dissacrazione e profanazione, la nostra civiltà come nessun'altra è fondata. (p. 58)
“La fenomenologia sociale è la scienza della mia e altrui esperienza.”
Essa si occupa della relazione tra la mia esperienza di te e la tua esperienza di me. Vale a dire dell'<i>inter-esperienza</i>. Inoltre riguarda il tuo e il mio comportamento come io lo sperimento, e il tuo e il mio comportamento come tu lo sperimenti. (Esperienza come evidenza)
Social phenomenology is the science of my own and of others' experience. It is concerned with the relation between my experience of you and your experience of me. That is, with inter-experience. It is concerned with your behaviour and my behaviour as I experience it, and your and my behaviour as you experience it.
da Conversando con i miei bambini, p. 75
Cap. 1 : Esperienza come evidenza
La rassicurazione conclusiva e il terrore finale.
Being and non-being is the central theme of all philosophy, East and West. These words are not harmless and innocent verbal arabesques, except in the professional philosophism of decadence. We are afraid to approach the fathomless and bottomless groundlessness of everything.
p. 3 dell'Introduzione
Origine: Da The Politics of Experience and The Bird of Paradise http://thehealingproject.net.au/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/R.D.-Laing.-The-Politics-of-Experience.pdf, Penguin, 1967.
Ronald Laing: Frasi in inglese
Origine: The Politics of Experience (1967), Ch. 1 : Experience as evidence
Contesto: I see you, and you see me. I experience you, and you experience me. I see your behaviour. You see my behaviour. But I do not and never have and never will see your experience of me. Just as you cannot "see" my experience of you. My experience of you is not "inside" me. It is simply you, as I experience you. And I do not experience you as inside me. Similarly, I take it that you do not experience me as inside you.
"My experience of you" is just another form of words for "you-as-l-experience-you", and "your experience of me" equals "me-as-you-experience-me". Your experience of me is not inside you and my experience of you is not inside me, but your experience of me is invisible to me and my experience of you is invisible to you.
“We can see other people's behaviour, but not their experience.”
Ch. 1 : Experience as evidence http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/laing.htm
The Politics of Experience (1967)
Contesto: Even facts become fictions without adequate ways of seeing "the facts". We do not need theories so much as the experience that is the source of the theory. We are not satisfied with faith, in the sense of an implausible hypothesis irrationally held: we demand to experience the "evidence".
We can see other people's behaviour, but not their experience. This has led some people to insist that psychology has nothing to do with the other person's experience, but only with his behaviour.
The other person's behaviour is an experience of mine. My behaviour is an experience of the other. The task of social phenomenology is to relate my experience of the other's behaviour to the other's experience of my behaviour. Its study is the relation between experience and experience: its true field is inter-experience.
Origine: The Divided Self (1960), Ch. 1 : The existential-phenomenological foundations for a science of persons
Contesto: Existential phenomenology attempts to characterize the nature of a person's experience of his world and himself. It is not so much an attempt to describe particular objects of his experience as to set all particular experiences within the context of his whole being-in-his-world. The mad things said and done by the schizophrenic will remain essentially a closed book if one does not understand their existential context. In describing one way of going mad, I shall try to show that there is a comprehensible transition from the sane schizoid way of being-in-the-world to a psychotic way of being-in-the-world. Although retaining the terms schizoid and schizophrenic for the sane and psychotic positions respectively, I shall not, of course, be using these terms in their usual clinical psychiatric frame of reference, but phenomenologically and existentially.
“There is little conjunction of truth and social "reality"”
Origine: The Politics of Experience (1967), p. 1 of Introduction
Contesto: Few books today are forgivable. Black on canvas, silence on the screen, an empty white sheet of paper are perhaps feasible. There is little conjunction of truth and social "reality". Around us are pseudo-events, to which we adjust with a false consciousness adapted to see these events as true and real, and even as beautiful. In the society of men the truth resides now less in what things are than in what they are not. Our social realities are so ugly if seen in the light of exiled truth, and beauty is almost no longer possible if it is not a lie. What is to be done? We who are still half alive, living in the often fibrillating heartland of a senescent capitalism — can we do more than reflect the decay around and within us? Can we do more than sing our sad and bitter songs of disillusion and defeat? The requirement of the present, the failure of the past, is the same: to provide a thoroughly self-conscious and self-critical human account of man.
“Insanity — a perfectly rational adjustment to an insane world.”
As quoted in Wisdom for the Soul : Five Millennia of Prescriptions for Spiritual Healing (2006) by Larry Chang, p. 412; this might be a paraphrase, as the earliest occurrence of this phrase thus far located is in the form: "Ronald David Laing has shocked many people when he suggested in 1972 that insanity can be a perfectly rational adjustment to an insane world." in Studii de literatură română și comparată (1984), by The Faculty of Philology-History at Universitatea din Timișoara. A clear citation to Laing's own work has not yet been found.
Disputed
Origine: The Politics of Experience (1967), p. 2 of Introduction
Contesto: We are all murderers and prostitutes — no matter to what culture, society, class, nation, we belong, no matter how normal, moral, or mature we take ourselves to be.
Humanity is estranged from its authentic possibilities. This basic vision prevents us from taking any unequivocal view of the sanity of common sense, or of the madness of the so-called madman. … Our alientation goes to the roots. The realisation of this is the essential springboard for any serious reflection on any aspect of present inter-human life.
Origine: The Divided Self (1960), Ch. 1 : The existential-phenomenological foundations for a science of persons
Contesto: Existential phenomenology attempts to characterize the nature of a person's experience of his world and himself. It is not so much an attempt to describe particular objects of his experience as to set all particular experiences within the context of his whole being-in-his-world. The mad things said and done by the schizophrenic will remain essentially a closed book if one does not understand their existential context. In describing one way of going mad, I shall try to show that there is a comprehensible transition from the sane schizoid way of being-in-the-world to a psychotic way of being-in-the-world. Although retaining the terms schizoid and schizophrenic for the sane and psychotic positions respectively, I shall not, of course, be using these terms in their usual clinical psychiatric frame of reference, but phenomenologically and existentially.
Origine: The Politics of Experience (1967), Ch. 1 : Experience as evidence
Contesto: I cannot experience your experience. You cannot experience my experience. We are both invisible men. All men are invisible to one another. Experience used to be called The Soul. Experience as invisibility of man to man is at the same time more evident than anything. Only experience is evident. Experience is the only evidence. Psychology is the logos of experience. Psychology is the structure of the evidence, and hence psychology is the science of sciences.
“Few books today are forgivable.”
Origine: The Politics of Experience (1967), p. 1 of Introduction
Contesto: Few books today are forgivable. Black on canvas, silence on the screen, an empty white sheet of paper are perhaps feasible. There is little conjunction of truth and social "reality". Around us are pseudo-events, to which we adjust with a false consciousness adapted to see these events as true and real, and even as beautiful. In the society of men the truth resides now less in what things are than in what they are not. Our social realities are so ugly if seen in the light of exiled truth, and beauty is almost no longer possible if it is not a lie. What is to be done? We who are still half alive, living in the often fibrillating heartland of a senescent capitalism — can we do more than reflect the decay around and within us? Can we do more than sing our sad and bitter songs of disillusion and defeat? The requirement of the present, the failure of the past, is the same: to provide a thoroughly self-conscious and self-critical human account of man.
Origine: The Politics of Experience (1967), p. 58
Contesto: Long before a thermonuclear war can come about, we have had to lay waste our own sanity. We begin with the children. It is imperative to catch them in time. Without the most thorough and rapid brainwashing their dirty minds would see through our dirty tricks. Children are not yet fools, but we shall turn them into imbeciles like ourselves, with high I. Q. s if possible.
From the moment of birth, when the Stone Age baby confronts the twentieth-century mother, the baby is subjected to these forces of violence, called love, as its mother and father, and their parents and their parents before them, have been. These forces are mainly concerned with destroying most of its potentialities, and on the whole this enterprise is successful.
Ch. 1 : Experience as evidence http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/laing.htm
The Politics of Experience (1967)
Contesto: Even facts become fictions without adequate ways of seeing "the facts". We do not need theories so much as the experience that is the source of the theory. We are not satisfied with faith, in the sense of an implausible hypothesis irrationally held: we demand to experience the "evidence".
We can see other people's behaviour, but not their experience. This has led some people to insist that psychology has nothing to do with the other person's experience, but only with his behaviour.
The other person's behaviour is an experience of mine. My behaviour is an experience of the other. The task of social phenomenology is to relate my experience of the other's behaviour to the other's experience of my behaviour. Its study is the relation between experience and experience: its true field is inter-experience.
Origine: The Politics of Experience (1967), p. 58
Contesto: Long before a thermonuclear war can come about, we have had to lay waste our own sanity. We begin with the children. It is imperative to catch them in time. Without the most thorough and rapid brainwashing their dirty minds would see through our dirty tricks. Children are not yet fools, but we shall turn them into imbeciles like ourselves, with high I. Q. s if possible.
From the moment of birth, when the Stone Age baby confronts the twentieth-century mother, the baby is subjected to these forces of violence, called love, as its mother and father, and their parents and their parents before them, have been. These forces are mainly concerned with destroying most of its potentialities, and on the whole this enterprise is successful.
“Social phenomenology is the science of my own and of others' experience.”
Origine: The Politics of Experience (1967), Ch. 1 : Experience as evidence
Contesto: Social phenomenology is the science of my own and of others' experience. It is concerned with the relation between my experience of you and your experience of me. That is, with inter-experience. It is concerned with your behaviour and my behaviour as I experience it, and your and my behaviour as you experience it.
“We are effectively destroying ourselves by violence masquerading as love.”
Origine: The Politics of Experience (1967), p. 58
Contesto: We are effectively destroying ourselves by violence masquerading as love. I am a specialist, God help me, in events in inner space and time, in experiences called thoughts, images, reveries, dreams, visions, hallucinations, dreams of memories, memories of dreams, memories of visions, dreams of hallucinations, refractions of refractions of refractions of that original Alpha and Omega of experience and reality, that Reality on whose repression, denial, splitting, projection, falsification, and general desecration and profanation our civilisation as much as anything is based.
Origine: The Politics of Experience (1967), p. 1 of Introduction
Contesto: Few books today are forgivable. Black on canvas, silence on the screen, an empty white sheet of paper are perhaps feasible. There is little conjunction of truth and social "reality". Around us are pseudo-events, to which we adjust with a false consciousness adapted to see these events as true and real, and even as beautiful. In the society of men the truth resides now less in what things are than in what they are not. Our social realities are so ugly if seen in the light of exiled truth, and beauty is almost no longer possible if it is not a lie. What is to be done? We who are still half alive, living in the often fibrillating heartland of a senescent capitalism — can we do more than reflect the decay around and within us? Can we do more than sing our sad and bitter songs of disillusion and defeat? The requirement of the present, the failure of the past, is the same: to provide a thoroughly self-conscious and self-critical human account of man.
Origine: The Politics of Experience (1967), Ch. 1 : Experience as evidence
Contesto: I cannot experience your experience. You cannot experience my experience. We are both invisible men. All men are invisible to one another. Experience used to be called The Soul. Experience as invisibility of man to man is at the same time more evident than anything. Only experience is evident. Experience is the only evidence. Psychology is the logos of experience. Psychology is the structure of the evidence, and hence psychology is the science of sciences.
“The other person's behaviour is an experience of mine. My behaviour is an experience of the other.”
Ch. 1 : Experience as evidence http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/laing.htm
The Politics of Experience (1967)
Contesto: Even facts become fictions without adequate ways of seeing "the facts". We do not need theories so much as the experience that is the source of the theory. We are not satisfied with faith, in the sense of an implausible hypothesis irrationally held: we demand to experience the "evidence".
We can see other people's behaviour, but not their experience. This has led some people to insist that psychology has nothing to do with the other person's experience, but only with his behaviour.
The other person's behaviour is an experience of mine. My behaviour is an experience of the other. The task of social phenomenology is to relate my experience of the other's behaviour to the other's experience of my behaviour. Its study is the relation between experience and experience: its true field is inter-experience.
Origine: The Politics of Experience (1967), Ch. 1 : Experience as evidence
Contesto: I cannot experience your experience. You cannot experience my experience. We are both invisible men. All men are invisible to one another. Experience used to be called The Soul. Experience as invisibility of man to man is at the same time more evident than anything. Only experience is evident. Experience is the only evidence. Psychology is the logos of experience. Psychology is the structure of the evidence, and hence psychology is the science of sciences.
Origine: The Politics of Experience (1967), p. 121
Origine: The Politics of Experience (1967), p. 1 of Introduction
Origine: The Politics of Experience (1967), p. 104
Origine: The Politics of Experience (1967), p. 28
Origine: The Politics of Experience (1967), p. 3 of Introduction
"Although innumerable beings have been led to Nirvana no being has been led to Nirvana", §5, p. 85
Knots (1970)
Attributed to R.D. Lang in: Jack Lee Seymour, Margaret Ann Crain, Joseph V. Crockett (1993) Educating Christians. p. 53
Origine: The Politics of Experience (1967), p.82 (of original version see Google Books link here https://books.google.com/books?id=ZGTUlU5E5rAC&dq=politics+of+experience&focus=searchwithinvolume&q=%22positivist+mistake%22)
