Frasi di David Hume
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David Hume è stato un filosofo scozzese.

È considerato il terzo e forse il più radicale dei British Empiricists , dopo l'inglese John Locke e l'anglo-irlandese George Berkeley. Wikipedia  

✵ 26. Aprile 1711 – 25. Agosto 1776
David Hume photo
David Hume: 170   frasi 11   Mi piace

David Hume frasi celebri

Frasi sugli uomini di David Hume

“[Che] i negri, e in generale tutte le altre specie di uomini siano per natura inferiori ai bianchi.”

citato in Gianni Scipione Rossi, Razzismo. Il buio della ragione nel secolo dei lumi

Frasi su come pensare di David Hume

“Io sono seduto nella mia camera con la faccia rivolta al fuoco, e tutti gli oggetti che colpiscono i miei sensi sono contenuti in pochi metri intorno a me. La memoria, invero, mi fa presente l'esistenza di molti oggetti; ma questa sua testimonianza non si estende oltre la loro precedente esistenza, né i sensi né la memoria attestano la continuità del loro essere. Mentre sono ancora seduto e rivolgo per la mente questi pensieri, sento ad un tratto un rumore, come di una porta che gira sopra i suoi cardini, e poco dopo vedo il portiere che avanza verso di me. Ciò mi dà occasione a molte riflessioni e nuovi ragionamenti. Anzitutto, io non ho mai osservato che quel rumore possa provenire da altro fuorché dal movimento di una porta, e quindi concludo che il presente fenomeno sarebbe in contraddizione con tutte le precedenti esperienze, qualora io non ammettessi che la porta, che ricordo dall'altra parte della camera, continua ad esistere. Ancora: ho sempre visto che un corpo umano possiede una qualità ch'io chiamo gravità, e che gl'impedisce di volare, come questo portiere dovrebbe aver fatto per giungere nella mia camera, se pensassi che la scala, di cui ho il ricordo, fosse stata distrutta nella mia assenza. Ma non è tutto. Io ricevo una lettera: aprendola, vedo dal carattere e dalla firma che viene da un amico che mi dice esser distante duecento leghe. È evidente che non posso mai rendermi ragione di questo fenomeno in conformità della mia esperienza in altri casi, senza far passare nella mia mente tutto il mare e il continente che ci separano, e senza supporre gli effetti e l'esistenza continuata dei corrieri e dei battelli, conforme alla mia memoria e osservazione. I fenomeni, dunque, del portiere e della lettera, sotto un certo aspetto sono in contraddizione con l'esperienza comune, e possono esser giudicati come obiezioni alle massime riguardanti la connessione tra cause ed effetti. Io, infatti, sono abituato a udire un certo suono nello stesso tempo che vedo un certo oggetto in movimento; in questo caso, invece, non ho ricevuto le due percezioni insieme. Sì che queste due osservazioni sono contrarie, a meno ch'io non supponga che la porta rimanga ancora, e che sia stata aperta senza ch'io ne abbia avuto la percezione. E questa supposizione, da principio arbitraria e ipotetica, acquista forza ed evidenza per essere la sola che possa conciliare quella contraddizione. Di questi casi se ne offrono continuamente nella mia vita, e mi spingono a supporre una continuata esistenza degli oggetti al fine di collegare le passate con le presenti loro apparizioni, e dare loro quella reciproca unione che ho trovato per esperienza convenire alla loro particolare natura e alle circostanze. Io sono, così, naturalmente portato a considerare il mondo come qualcosa di reale e di durevole, che mantiene la sua esistenza anche quando cessa di esser presente alla mia percezione.”

Trattato sulla natura umana

“Quasi tutti i ragionamenti in questo libro vengono ricondotti all'esperienza; e la credenza, che accompagna l'esperienza, viene spiegata soltanto come un sentimento peculiare, o una concezione vivace prodotta dall'abitudine. Né questo è tutto; quando noi crediamo che qualche cosa abbia un'esistenza esterna, o quando supponiamo che un oggetto esista un istante dopo che esso cessa di essere percepito, questa credenza non è che un sentimento della stessa specie. Il nostro autore insiste su parecchie altre tesi scettiche ed infine conclude che noi prestiamo fede alle nostre facoltà ed adoperiamo la ragione soltanto perché non possiamo farne a meno. La filosofia ci renderebbe interamente pirroniani, se la natura non fosse troppo forte su questo punto. Concluderò la logica di quest'autore dando ragione di due opinioni, che sembrano a lui peculiari, come sono, del resto, la maggior parte delle sue opinioni. Egli afferma che l'anima in quanto la possiamo concepire, non è che un sistema, una serie di percezioni differenti, di caldo e di freddo, di amore e di collera, di pensieri e di sensazioni, tutte unite insieme, ma senza alcuna perfetta semplicità o identità. Cartesio sosteneva che l'essenza della mente è il pensiero, non questo o quel pensiero, ma il pensiero in generale. Ma ciò pare del tutto inintelligibile, poiché ogni cosa che esiste è particolare, e perciò devono essere le nostre distinte percezioni particolari che compongono la mente. Dico, compongono la mente, non appartengono ad essa. La mente non è una sostanza, alla quale le percezioni ineriscano. Questa nozione è altrettanto inintelligibile di quella cartesiana secondo la quale il pensiero o la percezione in generale è l'essenza della mente. Noi non abbiamo alcuna idea di una sostanza di qualsiasi genere, perché non abbiamo alcuna idea che non sia derivata da qualche impressione e non abbiamo impressione alcuna di una qualsiasi sostanza, materiale o spirituale che sia. Noi conosciamo soltanto qualità e percezioni particolari. Come la nostra idea di un corpo, per esempio di una pesca, non è che l'idea di un particolare sapore, colore, figura, grandezza, solidità ecc., così la nostra idea di una mente non è che quella di particolari percezioni, senza la nozione di tutto quello che chiamiamo sostanza, semplice o composta che sia.
Il solo mezzo per cui possiamo sperare di ottenere un successo nelle nostre ricerche filosofiche è quello di abbandonare il tedioso ed estenuante metodo seguito fino ad oggi; invece d'impadronirci, di tanto in tanto, d'un castello o d'un villaggio alla frontiera, marciamo direttamente sulla capitale, ossia al centro di queste scienze, alla natura umana: padroni di esso, potremo sperare di ottenere ovunque una facile vittoria. Movendo di qui, potremo estendere la nostra conquista a tutte le scienze piú intimamente legate con la vita umana e procedere poi con agio a quelle che sono oggetto di pura curiosità. Non c'è questione di qualche importanza, la cui soluzione non sia compresa nella scienza dell'uomo, e non c'è nessuna che possa venire risolta con certezza se prima non la padroneggiamo. Accingendoci quindi a spiegare i princípi della natura umana, noi miriamo in realtà a un sistema completo delle scienze costruito su di un fondamento quasi del tutto nuovo e tale che solo su esso possano poggiare con sicurezza.”

Trattato sulla natura umana

David Hume Frasi e Citazioni

“L'abitudine […] è la grande guida della vita umana.”

Origine: Da Ricerche sull'intelletto umano, 5, 1; citato in Dizionario delle citazioni, a cura di Ettore Barelli e Sergio Pennacchietti, BUR, 2013.

“Sii filosofo; ma in mezzo a tutta la tua filosofia, sii sempre un uomo.”

Origine: Da Ricerca sull'intelletto umano, sez. I; citato in Guido Ceronetti, La pazienza dell'arrostito: giornale e ricordi (1983-1987), Adelphi, Milano, 1990, p. 68. ISBN 88-459-0793-7

“Se dobbiamo essere sempre in preda ad errori e illusioni, preferiamo che siano almeno naturali e piacevoli.”

Origine: Citato in Giovanni Reale, Dario Antiseri, Il pensiero occidentale dalle origini ad oggi, 2, Dall'Umanesimo a Kant, 2. ed., La Scuola, Brescia, 1983, p. 414.

“Gli ambiti in cui i ricchi ricavano poco, devono contribuire in gran parte alla soddisfazione delle necessità publiche.”

Origine: Citato in AA.VV., Il libro dell'economia, traduzione di Olga Amagliani e Martina Dominici, Gribaudo, 2018, p. 47. ISBN 9788858014158

David Hume: Frasi in inglese

“Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them.”

David Hume libro Trattato sulla natura umana

Introduction
A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40)
Contesto: Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. 'Tis easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself.

“It is, therefore, a just political maxim, that every man must be supposed a knave: Though at the same time, it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim should be true in politics, which is false in fact.”

David Hume libro Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary

Part I, Essay 6: Of The Independency of Parliament; first line often paraphrased as "It is a just political maxim, that every man must be supposed a knave."
Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary (1741-2; 1748)
Contesto: It is, therefore, a just political maxim, that every man must be supposed a knave: Though at the same time, it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim should be true in politics, which is false in fact. But to satisfy us on this head, we may consider, that men are generally more honest in their private than in their public capacity, and will go greater lengths to serve a party, than when their own private interest is alone concerned. Honour is a great check upon mankind: But where a considerable body of men act together, this check is, in a great measure, removed; since a man is sure to be approved of by his own party, for what promotes the common interest; and he soon learns to despise the clamours of adversaries.

“What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we call thought, that we must thus make it the model of the whole universe?”

David Hume libro Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

Philo to Cleanthes, Part II
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779)
Contesto: What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we call thought, that we must thus make it the model of the whole universe? Our partiality in our own favour does indeed present it on all occasions; but sound philosophy ought carefully to guard against so natural an illusion.

“The whole is a riddle, an aenigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspence of judgment appear the only result of our most accurate scrutiny, concerning this subject.”

David Hume Storia naturale della religione

Part XV - General corollary
The Natural History of Religion (1757)
Contesto: The whole is a riddle, an aenigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspence of judgment appear the only result of our most accurate scrutiny, concerning this subject. But such is the frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarcely be upheld; did we not enlarge our view, and opposing one species of superstition to another, set them a quarrelling; while we ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily make our escape, into the calm, though obscure, regions of philosophy.

“The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind Nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children!”

David Hume libro Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

Philo to Cleanthes, Part XI
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779)
Contesto: Look round this universe. What an immense profusion of beings, animated and organised, sensible and active! You admire this prodigious variety and fecundity. But inspect a little more narrowly these living existences, the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and destructive to each other! How insufficient all of them for their own happiness! How contemptible or odious to the spectator! The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind Nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children!

“For with what confidence can I venture upon such bold enterprises, when beside those numberless infirmities peculiar to myself, I find so many which are common to human nature? Can I be sure, that in leaving all established opinions I am following truth; and by what criterion shall I distinguish her, even if fortune shou'd at last guide me on her foot-steps?”

David Hume libro Trattato sulla natura umana

Part 4, Section 7
A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), Book 1: Of the understanding
Contesto: I am first affrighted and confounded with that forelorn solitude, in which I am plac'd in my philosophy, and fancy myself some strange uncouth monster, who not being able to mingle and unite in society, has been expell'd all human commerce, and left utterly abandon'd and disconsolate. Fain wou'd I run into the crowd for shelter and warmth; but cannot prevail with myself to mix with such deformity. I call upon others to join me, in order to make a company apart; but no one will hearken to me. Every one keeps at a distance, and dreads that storm, which beats upon me from every side. I have expos'd myself to the enmity of all metaphysicians, logicians, mathematicians, and even theologians; and can I wonder at the insults I must suffer? I have declar'd my disapprobation of their systems; and can I be surpriz'd, if they shou'd express a hatred of mine and of my person? When I look abroad, I foresee on every side, dispute, contradiction, anger, calumny and detraction. When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but doubt and ignorance. All the world conspires to oppose and contradict me; tho' such is my weakness, that I feel all my opinions loosen and fall of themselves, when unsupported by the approbation of others. Every step I take is with hesitation, and every new reflection makes me dread an error and absurdity in my reasoning.
For with what confidence can I venture upon such bold enterprises, when beside those numberless infirmities peculiar to myself, I find so many which are common to human nature? Can I be sure, that in leaving all established opinions I am following truth; and by what criterion shall I distinguish her, even if fortune shou'd at last guide me on her foot-steps? After the most accurate and exact of my reasonings, I can give no reason why I shou'd assent to it; and feel nothing but a strong propensity to consider objects strongly in that view, under which they appear to me. Experience is a principle, which instructs me in the several conjunctions of objects for the past. Habit is another principle, which determines me to expect the same for the future; and both of them conspiring to operate upon the imagination, make me form certain ideas in a more intense and lively manner, than others, which are not attended with the same advantages. Without this quality, by which the mind enlivens some ideas beyond others (which seemingly is so trivial, and so little founded on reason) we cou'd never assent to any argument, nor carry our view beyond those few objects, which are present to our senses. Nay, even to these objects we cou'd never attribute any existence, but what was dependent on the senses; and must comprehend them entirely in that succession of perceptions, which constitutes our self or person. Nay farther, even with relation to that succession, we cou'd only admit of those perceptions, which are immediately present to our consciousness, nor cou'd those lively images, with which the memory presents us, be ever receiv'd as true pictures of past perceptions. The memory, senses, and understanding are, therefore, all of them founded on the imagination, or the vivacity of our ideas.

“Beauty is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty.”

David Hume libro Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary

Part I, Essay 23: Of The Standard of Taste
Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary (1741-2; 1748)
Origine: Of the Standard of Taste and Other Essays
Contesto: Beauty is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty. One person may even perceive deformity, where another is sensible of beauty; and every individual ought to acquiesce in his own sentiment, without pretending to regulate those of others.

“Generally speaking, the errors in religion are dangerous; those in philosophy only ridiculous.”

David Hume libro Trattato sulla natura umana

Part 4, Section 7
Origine: A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), Book 1: Of the understanding

“EPICURUS's old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?”

David Hume libro Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

Philo to Cleanthes, Part X
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779)
Contesto: And is it possible, CLEANTHES, said PHILO, that after all these reflections, and infinitely more, which might be suggested, you can still persevere in your Anthropomorphism, and assert the moral attributes of the Deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of the same nature with these virtues in human creatures? His power we allow is infinite: whatever he wills is executed: but neither man nor any other animal is happy: therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: He is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: But the course of Nature tends not to human or animal felicity: therefore it is not established for that purpose. Through the whole compass of human knowledge, there are no inferences more certain and infallible than these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men? EPICURUS's old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?

“He is happy, whose circumstances suit his temper; but he is more excellent, who can suit his temper to any circumstances.”

David Hume libro An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals

§ 6.9 : Of Qualities Useful to Ourselves, Pt. 1
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751)

“Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.”

David Hume libro An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

Section 1 : Of The Different Species of Philosophy
Origine: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)
Contesto: Nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to the human race, and secretly admonished them to allow none of these biases to draw too much, so as to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments. Indulge your passion for science, says she, but let your science be human, and such as may have a direct reference to action and society. Abstruse thought and profound researches I prohibit, and will severely punish, by the pensive melancholy which they introduce, by the endless uncertainty in which they involve you, and by the cold reception which your pretended discoveries shall meet with, when communicated. Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.

“… no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavors to establish.”

David Hume libro An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

Section 10 : Of Miracles Pt. 1
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)
Origine: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding/An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals

“Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”

David Hume libro Trattato sulla natura umana

Part 3, Section 3
Part 3, Section 3
Origine: A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), Book 2: Of the passions
Contesto: We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.
Contesto: What may at first occur on this head, is, that as nothing can be contrary to truth or reason, except what has a reference to it, and as the judgments of our understanding only have this reference, it must follow, that passions can be contrary to reason only so far as they are accompany'd with some judgment or opinion. According to this principle, which is so obvious and natural, `tis only in two senses, that any affection can be call'd unreasonable. First, When a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is founded on the supposition or the existence of objects, which really do not exist. Secondly, When in exerting any passion in action, we chuse means insufficient for the design'd end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects. Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chuses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it. `Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. `Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. `Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledge'd lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter. A trivial good may, from certain circumstances, produce a desire superior to what arises from the greatest and most valuable enjoyment; nor is there any thing more extraordinary in this, than in mechanics to see one pound weight raise up a hundred by the advantage of its situation. In short, a passion must be accompany'd with some false judgment. in order to its being unreasonable; and even then `tis not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment.

“It is seldom, that liberty of any kind is lost all at once.”

David Hume libro Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary

Part I, Essay 2: Of the Liberty of the Press
Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary (1741-2; 1748)
Contesto: It is a very comfortable reflection to the lovers of liberty, that this peculiar privilege of Britain is of a kind that cannot easily be wrested from us, but must last as long as our government remains, in any degree, free and independent. It is seldom, that liberty of any kind is lost all at once. Slavery has so frightful an aspect to men accustomed to freedom, that it must steal upon them by degrees, and must disguise itself in a thousand shapes, in order to be received. But, if the liberty of the press ever be lost, it must be lost at once. The general laws against sedition and libelling are at present as strong as they possibly can be made. Nothing can impose a farther restraint, but either the clapping an Imprimatur upon the press, or the giving to the court very large discretionary powers to punish whatever displeases them. But these concessions would be such a bare-faced violation of liberty, that they will probably be the last efforts of a despotic government. We may conclude, that the liberty of Britain is gone for ever when these attempts shall succeed.

“That original intelligence, say the MAGIANS, who is the first principle of all things, discovers himself immediately to the mind and understanding alone; but has placed the sun as his image in the visible universe; and when that bright luminary diffuses its beams over the earth and the firmament, it is a faint copy of the glory which resides in the higher heavens. If you would escape the displeasure of this divine being, you must be careful never to set your bare foot upon the ground, nor spit into a fire, nor throw any water upon it, even though it were consuming a whole city. Who can express the perfections of the Almighty? say the Mahometans. Even the noblest of his works, if compared to him, are but dust and rubbish. How much more must human conception fall short of his infinite perfections? His smile and favour renders men for ever happy; and to obtain it for your children, the best method is to cut off from them, while infants, a little bit of skin, about half the breadth of a farthing. Take two bits of cloth, say the Roman catholics, about an inch or an inch and a half square, join them by the corners with two strings or pieces of tape about sixteen inches long, throw this over your head, and make one of the bits of cloth lie upon your breast, and the other upon your back, keeping them next your skin: There is not a better secret for recommending yourself to that infinite Being, who exists from eternity to eternity.”

David Hume Storia naturale della religione

Part VII - Confirmation of this doctrine
The Natural History of Religion (1757)

“Tis only from the selfishness and confin'd generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origin.”

David Hume libro Trattato sulla natura umana

Part 2, Section 2
A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), Book 3: Of morals

“Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact; it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors.”

David Hume libro An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

Section 10 : Of Miracles Pt. 1
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)

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