Frasi di Johann Gottlieb Fichte (146 frasi, pagina 4)

da Discorsi alla nazione tedesca, IX discorso; citato in William Boyd, Storia dell'educazione occidentale, traduzione di Trieste Valdi, Armando Armando Editore, 1966

Sull'amore , Sul mondo , Sull'istruzione , Sulla pace

“Il fine supremo ed ultimo della società è la completa unità e l'intimo consentimento di tutti i suoi membri.”

Johann Gottlieb Fichte

dalle Lezioni sulla missione del dotto, 1794

Sull'età

“In questo mio Io sensibile c'è […] una quantità di modificazioni che non sono da ricondurre a quelle forme immodificabili del mio Io puro; modificazioni sulle quali l'immutabile legge morale non stabilisce nulla e la cui determinazione quindi dipende dal mio arbitrio, che è esso stesso mutevole.”

Johann Gottlieb Fichte

da Lo Stato di tutto il popolo, a cura di Nicolao Merker, Roma 1978

“La scelta di una filosofia dipende da quel che si è come uomo, perché un sistema filosofico non è un inerte suppellettile, che si possa prendere o lasciare a piacere, ma è animato dallo spirito dell'uomo che l'ha.”

Johann Gottlieb Fichte

dalla Prima introduzione alla dottrina della scienza, 1797

Sul piacere , Scienza

“L'Io puro oppone nell'Io ad un io divisibile un non-io divisibile.”

Johann Gottlieb Fichte

dalla Dottrina della scienza, 1794

Scienza

“L'umanità respinge il cieco caso e il potere del destino. Essa ha in mano il proprio destino.”

Johann Gottlieb Fichte

citato in Roger Garaudy, Karl Marx

Sul destino

“L'uomo può ciò che egli deve; e se dice: "Io non posso", segno è che non vuole.”

Johann Gottlieb Fichte

da Contributo per rettificare i giudizi del pubblico sulla Rivoluzione francese, 1793

“Noi agiamo perché conosciamo, ma conosciamo perché siamo destinati ad agire; la ragion pratica è la radice di ogni ragione.”

Johann Gottlieb Fichte

da La missione degli uomini, 1800

Sugli uomini

“L'uomo dunque […] ha la missione di vivere per la società; e perciò, tra quelle abilità che egli deve perfezionare in sé stesso […], dovrà annoverarsi anche la socievolezza.”

Johann Gottlieb Fichte

II; 1943, p. 109
La missione del dotto

“Levo il mio capo ben alto sopra le rupi minacciose, e sopra le furiose cascate, e sopra le nubi che ruotano, lacerate dai tuoni fragorosi, in un mare di fuoco: e posso dire: Sono eterno, e sfido la vostra potenza! Piombate voi tutte, o potenze della natura, sopra di me; tu, o Terra, e tu, o Cielo, confondetevi nel caos primordiale; e voi, o Elementi tutti, schiumeggiate ed infuriate e triturate con selvaggia ostilità fin la più piccola particella di quel corpo che io chiamo mio: la mia volontà sola, col suo piano immutabile, si librerà con fredda tenacia sulle macerie dell'universo. Giacché io ho accettata la mia missione, ed essa, o potenze naturali tutte, è più duratura di voi; essa è eterna, ed io sono eterno, come essa è.”

Johann Gottlieb Fichte

III; 1943, p. 141
La missione del dotto

Sull'ostilità , Mare , Natura , Universo

Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Frasi in inglese

“The free being with absolute freedom proposes to itself certain ends. It wills because it wills, and the willing of an object is itself the last ground of such willing. Thus we have previously determined a free being, and any other determination would destroy the conception of an Ego, or of a free being. Now, if it could be so arranged that the willing of an unlawful end would necessarily — in virtue of an always effective law — result in the very reverse of that end, then the unlawful will would always ANNIHILATE ITSELF. A person could not will that end for the very reason because he did will it; his unlawful will would become the ground of its own annihilation, as the will is indeed always its own last ground.”

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Johann Gottlieb Fichte

Origine: The Science of Rights 1796, p. 193

“All law relations are determined by this principle: each one must restrict his freedom by the possibility of the freedom of the other. … My freedom is limited by the freedom of the other only on condition that he limits his freedom by the conception of mine. Otherwise he is lawless. Hence, if a law-relation is to result from my cognition of the other, the cognition and the consequent limitation of freedom must have been mutual. All law-relation between persons is, therefore, conditioned by their mutual cognition of each other, and is, at the same time, completely determined thereby.”

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Johann Gottlieb Fichte

Origine: The Science of Rights 1796, P. 173-175

“But how shall the condition, the true subjection of the other to the law, be given? Not through signs of repentance, promises of future better behavior, offers of damages, etc.; for there is no ground to believe his sincerity. It is quite as possible that he has been forced by his present weakness into this repentance, and is only awaiting a better opportunity to renew the attack. This uncertainty does not warrant the other in laying down his arms and thus again exposing all his safety. He will, therefore, continue to exercise his compulsion; but since the condition of the right is problematical, his exercise also will be problematical. t is the same with the violator. If he has offered the complete restitution which the law inevitably requires, and it being possible that he may now have voluntarily subjected himself in all sincerity to the law, it is also likely that he will oppose any further restriction of his freedom, (any further compulsion by the other,) but his right to make this opposition is also problematical. It seems, therefore, that the decisive point can not be ascertained, since it rests in the ascertainment of inner sincerity, which can not be proved, but is a matter of conscience for each. The ground of decision, indeed, could be given only, if it were possible to ascertain the whole future life of the violator.”

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Johann Gottlieb Fichte

Origine: The Science of Rights 1796, P. 145

“The law commands that the other person shall treat me as a rational being. He does not do so; and the law now absolves mc from all obligation to treat him as a rational being. But by that very absolving it makes itself valid. For the law, in saying that it depends now altogether upon my free-will how I desire to treat the other, or that I have a compulsory right against him, says, virtually, that the other person can not prevent my compulsion; that is, can not prevent it through the mere principle of law, though he may prevent it through physical strength, or through an appeal to morality, (may induce me to forego my compelling him, or prevent me from compelling him by superior strength.)If an absolute community is to be established between persons, as such, each member thereof must assume the above law; for only by constantly treating each other as free beings can they remain free beings or persons. Moreover, since it is possible for each member to treat the other as not a free being, but as a mere thing, it is also conceivable that each member may form the resolve, never to treat the others as mere things, but always as free beings; and since for such a resolve no other ground is discoverable than that such a community of free beings ought to exist, it is also conceivable that each member should have formed that resolve from this ground and upon this presupposition.”

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Johann Gottlieb Fichte

Origine: The Science of Rights 1796, P. 132

“What man is to be, he must become; and as he is to be a being for himself, must become through himself. Nature completed all her works; only from man did she withdraw her hands, and precisely thereby gave him over to himself. Cultivability, as such, is the character of mankind. The impossibility of subsuming to the human form any other conception than that of his own Ego, is it, which forces every man inwardly to consider every other man as his equal.”

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Johann Gottlieb Fichte

Origine: The Science of Rights 1796, P. 119

“When one rational being affects another rational being as mere matter, then the lower sense of that being is also affected, it is true, and is so affected necessarily and altogether independently of the freedom of that being, (as the lower sense is indeed always affected;) but it is not to be assumed that this affection was in the intention of the person who produced it. His intention was merely to attain his purpose, to express his conception in matter, and he never took into consideration whether that matter would feel it or not. Hence, the reciprocal influence of rational beings upon each other, as such, always occurs by means of the higher sense; for only the higher sense is one which cannot be affected without having been presupposed. Our criterion of this reciprocal influence remains, therefore, correct.”

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Johann Gottlieb Fichte

Origine: The Science of Rights 1796, P. 108

“I posit myself as individual, in opposition to another individual, by ascribing to myself a sphere for my freedom, from which I exclude the other, and by ascribing to him a sphere, from which I exclude myself — of course, only in the thinking of a fact and by virtue of this fact. Hence, I have posited myself as free a side of him without danger to the possibility of his freedom. Through this positing of my freedom I have determined myself; to be free constitutes my essential character. But what does to be free mean? Evidently to be able to carry out the conceptions of acts I may entertain. But the carrying out always follows the conception, and the perception of the desired product of my causality is always — in relation to its first conception — a matter of the future. Freedom is therefore always posited in the future; and if it is to constitute the character of a being, it is posited for all the future of the individual; is posited in the future as far as the individual himself is posited in the future.”

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Johann Gottlieb Fichte

Origine: The Science of Rights 1796, P. 77

“The subject must distinguish itself through opposition from the rational being, which it has assumed outside of itself. The subject has posited itself as one, which contains in itself the last ground of something that is in it, (for this is the condition of Egohood, or of Rationality generally;) but it has also posited a being outside of itself, as the last ground of this something in it. It is to have the power of distinguishing itself from this other being; and this is, under our presupposition, possible only, if the subject can distinguish in that given something how far the ground of this something lies in itself and how far it lies outside of itself.”

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Johann Gottlieb Fichte

Origine: The Science of Rights 1796, P. 63

“The conception of Rights involves that when men are to live in a community, each must so restrict his freedom as to permit the coexistence of the freedom of all others. But it does not involve that this particular person, A, is to restrict his freedom by the freedom of those particular persons, B, C, and D. That it has happened so that I, A, must conform myself particularly to the freedom of these, B, C, and D, of all other men, is purely the result of my living together with them; and I so live with them, simply by my free-will, not because there is an obligation for me to do so.”

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Johann Gottlieb Fichte

Origine: The Science of Rights 1796, P. 23-24

“I posit myself as rational, that is, as free. In doing so I have the representation of freedom. In the same undivided act I posit other free beings. Hence, I describe through my power of imagination a sphere of freedom, which these many separate beings divide amongst themselves. I do not ascribe to myself all the freedom which I have posited, because I must also posit other free beings, and must ascribe part of it to them. Thus, in appropriating freedom to myself, I at the same time restrict myself, by leaving freedom to others.”

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Johann Gottlieb Fichte

Origine: The Science of Rights 1796, P. 7-8

“Whether there can be love without esteem?”

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Johann Gottlieb Fichte

Oh yes, thou dear, pure one! Love is of many kinds. Rousseau proves that by his reasoning and still better by his example. La pauvre Maman and Madame N____ love in very different fashions. But I believe there are many kinds of love which do not appear in Rousseau’s life. You are very right in saying that no true and enduring love can exist without cordial esteem; that every other draws regret after it, and is unworthy of any noble soul. One word about pietism. Pietists place religion chiefly in externals; in acts of worship performed mechanically, without aim, as bond-service to god; in orthodoxy of opinion; and they have this among other characteristic marks, that they give themselves more solicitude about other’s piety than their own. It is not right to hate these men,-we should hate no one, but to me they are very contemptible, for their character implies the most deplorable emptiness of the head, and the most sorrowful perversion of the heart. Such my dear friend never can be; she cannot become such, even were it possible-which it is not-that her character were perverted; she can never become such, her nature has too much reality in it. You trust in Providence, your anticipation of a future life, are wise, and Christian. I hope, I may venture to speak of myself, that no one will take me to be a pietist or stiff formalist, but I know no feeling more thoroughly interwoven with my soul than these are.
Johann Fichte Letter to Johanna Rahn from Johann Gottlieb Fichte's popular works: Memoir and The Nature of the Scholar https://archive.org/stream/johanngottlieb00fichuoft#page/14/mode/1up